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This paper examines existence of Markov equilibria in the class of dynamic political games
(DPGs). DPGs are dynamic games in which political institutions are endogenously determined
each period. The process of change is both recursive and instrumental: the rules for political aggre-
gation at date t+1 are decided by the rules at date t, and the resulting institutional choices do not
aﬀect payoﬀs or technology directly.
Equilibrium existence in dynamic political games requires a resolution to a “political ﬁxed point
problem” in which a current political rule (e.g., majority voting) admits a solution only if all feasible
political rules in the future admit solutions in all states. If the class of political rules is dynamically
consistent, then DPGs are shown to admit political ﬁxed points. This result is used to prove two
equilibrium existence theorems, one of which implies that equilibrium strategies, public and private,
are smooth functions of the economic state. We discuss practical applications that require existence
of smooth equilibria.
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11 Introduction
This paper introduces, and examines equilibrium existence in, a class of dynamic political
games. Dynamic political games (or DPGs) are inﬁnite horizon, stochastic games in which
political institutions are determined endogenously.
Dynamic political games have two deﬁning features. First, the process of institutional
change is recursive: the rules for choosing public decisions in period t + 1 are, themselves,
objects of choice in period t. Second, the process is instrumental: the rules do not aﬀect payoﬀs
or technology directly. DPGs distinguish between “economic” and “political” states that are
jointly determined each period. The economic states comprise substantive parameters that
aﬀect preferences and technology directly. Whereas, political states are procedural parameters
that characterize the explicit political rule, such as the majority voting rule, for determining
public sector decisions. Decision makers in a DPG can modify existing institutions, not
because the details of political procedures enter into the utility functions, but rather because
institutional changes modify future economic states.
DPGs admit a broad array of institutional changes. We give examples of these that
include changes in the voting rule (majority vs supermajority rules), changes in voting rights
(e.g. larger vs smaller voting franchise), and changes in the scope of the public sector (e.g.,
expansions vs contractions of regulatory authority).
Because the pace of institutional change is captured succinctly by the evolution of political
states, DPGs are natural objects in which to study stability and reform of political institutions.
These issues are taken up in a companion paper, Lagunoﬀ (2004b).1
The present paper, meanwhile, establishes existence of a natural adaptation of Markov
Perfect equilibrium to dynamic political games. According to this adaptation, a Markov
equilibrium is a collection of private and public sector Markov strategies such that (a) the
strategy of each individual in the private sector is optimal for that individual in every state,
and (b) decisions in the public sector are consistent with the prevailing political rule in
every state. Our restriction to Markov equilibria follows a general rule of thumb: changes in
political institutions often occur on an economy-wide scale; in an economy-wide context, the
participants are less apt to coordinate on non payoﬀ-relevant history than they would if they
were in a small group.
A number of interesting issues arise in DPGs that make equilibrium existence more than
a standard technical exercise. Any recursive political model incurs the following “political
ﬁxed point problem.” Unlike in standard social choice problems, political rules here operate
on endogenous objects. A proﬁle of payoﬀs in this model is a proﬁle of average discounted
1That paper also contains a broader motivation, citing a number historical examples in which political
institutions are modiﬁed.
1vectors of the form (1 − δ)ut + δVt+1 where ut is the current stage payoﬀ vector, δ is the
discount factor, and Vt+1 is the vector of continuations. The endogeneity arises because the
continuation Vt+1 is the result of the application of a political rule in period t+1. In turn, this
period t + 1 political rule is deﬁned on payoﬀ proﬁles that depend on continuation Vt+2 that,
itself, results from the application of a political rule in period t + 2, and so on... To ensure
that these objects are well deﬁned, the implied map from future (state-contingent) strategies
to current ones must have a “political ﬁxed point.”
Existence of political ﬁxed points, however, is not automatic. If, for example, the current
political rule is a simple majority rule, then the feasible set of outcomes under majority rule
is typically given by the set of Condorcet Winners — the choices which cannot be defeated
by any alternative choice in a majority vote. In this case, however, voting cycles can arise,
and voting cycles present well known problems for existence. While this problem arises in
all recursive models of political aggregation, it is especially troublesome in DPGs because
public decisions here are inherently multi-dimensional: both the current policy and the future
political rule are chosen each period. Consequently, standard “ﬁxes” such as single peakedness
do not work.
Our results emphasize the importance of dynamic consistency for resolving this problem.
Roughly, a political rule is dynamically consistent if it is rationalized by a time separable
social welfare function. We show that if rules are dynamically consistent then under standard
technical conditions (continuity and compactness), DPGs admit political ﬁxed points. This
is proved by showing that the associated “Bellman’s map” has a ﬁxed point in the space of
continuation value functions. An important special case is the class of all voting rules. If stage
game payoﬀs admit an aﬃne representation then each voting rule is partially rationalized by
the preferences of the same pivotal voter in all states. This aﬃne preference representation is
similar to (and somewhat more restrictive than) the class of Intermediate Preferences intro-
duced by Grandmont (1978) to prove a multi-dimensional Median Voter Theorem. Since the
preferences of the pivotal voter are dynamically consistent, political ﬁxed points exist under
voting rules and aﬃne stage payoﬀs.
We use these results to establish two equilibrium existence theorems. The ﬁrst asserts
that (mixed) Markov Perfect equilibria exist when state and action spaces are ﬁnite. The
second, and main, theorem establishes suﬃcient conditions under which equilibria exist that
are smooth functions of the economic state. Both results make critical use of dynamic con-
sistency. The intuition, roughly, is that because dynamically consistent rules are rationalized
by time separable welfare functions, each such rule can be treated as a “player” in the game.
The “trick” is to ﬁnd the right mapping that transforms the DPG into a standard stochastic
game with private decisions.
The second result also adapts arguments from an elegant result of Horst (2003) who proves
the existence of almost-everywhere diﬀerentiable Markov equilibria in standard, stochastic
2games. Horst’s result applies to many economically interesting dynamic environments with
unbounded state space such as environments with capital accumulation. The key assumption
in his result is a “moderate social inﬂuence” condition whereby an individual’s own actions
have a relatively greater eﬀect on his marginal dynamic payoﬀ than those of all other indi-
viduals combined. The moderate social inﬂuence condition is shown to bound uniformly the
marginal best replies via the Implicit Function Theorem. It serves a similar purpose in the
present result.
Smooth Markov equilibria are useful for practical applications. For example, they provide
one clear justiﬁcation for Euler equation characterizations in dynamic politico-economic mod-
els. Examples include Klein, Krusell, and Rios-Rull (2002) and Jack and Lagunoﬀ (2003). In
particular, computational techniques developed by Klein, Krusell, and Rios-Rull (2002) char-
acterize the optimal policy functions resulting from median voter and other political rules.
They compute these functions from “generalized Euler equations” that are higher order dif-
ferential equations of future policy functions. These Euler equations are well-deﬁned only if
there exist Markov equilibria that admit higher order derivatives of the economic state.
This paper and its companion follow a growing literature on dynamic, endogenous in-
stitutional change. The list includes Roberts (1998, 1999), Justman and Gradstein (1999),
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001), Lagunoﬀ (2001), Barbera, Maschler, and Shalev (2001),
Messner and Polborn (2002), Jack and Lagunoﬀ (2003), Gradstein (2003), and Greif and Laitin
(2004). These are dynamic/repeated game models in which some attribute of an aggregation
rule may be chosen each period. The main diﬀerence between the present paper and most of
the literature is that the choice of rule here is both recursive and instrumental.2
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a less formal version of the
model in order to highlight some issues and problems of in our framework. The general model
is described in Section 3. There, we introduce the class of political rules. Political rules are
natural objects of choice in a recursive model of endogenous institutions. A dynamic political
game combines both the public and private sectors of the environment. An “equilibrium”
combines standard Markov Perfection in private decisions with a political ﬁxed point require-
ment for public decisions. Section 4 examines the political ﬁxed point problem and describes
the existence results more generally. Section 5 oﬀer concluding remarks. Details of some of
the proofs are in the Appendix in Section 6.
2Jack and Lagunoﬀ (2003) is an exception. See the companion paper, Lagunoﬀ (2004b), for a more detailed
discussion of the literature.
32 Political Fixed Points: An Example
We begin with a simpliﬁed, “stripped down” version of the general model. Consider initially
an equilibrium model of period-by-period majority voting with inﬁnitely lived agents. For
now, the institutional environment is ﬁxed.
At each date t =1 ,2,..., a set I = {1,...,n} of individuals must vote to decide a policy
pt at date t. In the general model, pt is an abstract representation of any vector of public
sector decisions. Let P denote the set of all feasible policies. For example, one could have
P =[ 0 ,1] as the set of all ﬂat tax rates. The current state is ωt drawn from a set Ω. In the
ﬂat tax example, ωt could describe the distribution of earnings across individuals. The state
enters directly into each individual’s stage payoﬀ, and it also enters the transition function
that determines the future state. For now, omit (notationally) private sector behavior such
as individuals’ savings decisions.3
A policy strategy ψ is a Markov strategy specifying the policy pt = ψ(ωt) as a function of
state ωt at date t. Given state ωt, individual i’s (i =1 ,...,n) average discounted dynamic
payoﬀ over policies is expressed in a recursive form by
Ui(ωt; ψ)(pt) ≡ (1 − δ)ui(ωt,p t)+δ
Z
Vi(ωt+1;ψ)dq(ωt+1| ωt,p t) (1)
where δ is the discount factor, ui is the stage game payoﬀ received in each period, q denotes the
stochastic transition function mapping current states and policies into probability distributions
over future states, and Vi is i’s continuation payoﬀ given policy rule ψ.4 If pt is chosen
each period by a simple majority vote, then pairwise comparisons of policy are evaluated
by each individual using his recursive payoﬀ function Ui(ωt;ψ)(·) in (1). By construction,
Ui(ωt; ψ)(ψ(ωt)) = Vi(ωt;ψ). In other words, the continuation payoﬀ is the recursive payoﬀ
function evaluated the policy strategy.
The proﬁle of payoﬀ functions is U(ωt;ψ)=( Ui(ωt;ψ))n
i=1. For each such proﬁle, the out-
come of majority voting is typically represented by the set of Condorcet Winners — outcomes
that survive all pairwise comparisons in a majority vote. Denote this set by C(U(ωt;ψ)).5
For the policy strategy ψ to be consistent with C(U(ωt;ψ)), it must satisfy the “political ﬁxed
point” problem
ψ(ωt) ∈ C(U(ωt;ψ)) , ∀ωt (2)
3Private sector behavior will be introduced in the next Section.
4The transition q is assumed to satisfy the standard measurability assumptions.
5Formally, p ∈ C(U(ωt;ψ)) if for all ˆ p 6= p,
|{i : Ui(ωt;ψ)(ˆ p) >U i(ωt;ψ)(p)}| ≤ n/2.
4Clearly, (2) deﬁnes a ﬁxed point. Condition (2) is also reminiscent of an implementation
property, although it diﬀers from implementation in the critical sense the preference domain
is endogenously determined by the ﬁxed point property. For this reason, it makes no sense to
speak of “truth-telling” constraints in a ﬁxed domain of preference characteristics.
In the current period t, a Condorcet Winner exists if voting is cycle proof. But since voting
takes place each period, the continuation payoﬀ Vi already encodes future voting outcomes,
and so the voting rule at date t is cycle-proof only if Condorcet Winners exist in all future
dates.
Though couched in diﬀerent terminology, this political ﬁxed point problem has recent an-
tecedents in the politico-economic literature, beginning with the pioneering work of Krusell,
Quadrini, and R´ ıos-Rull (1997).6 They specify a general “political aggregator function” anal-
ogous to our Condorcet operator. One key insight of theirs is that any social choice function,
Condorcet or otherwise, must operate on the proﬁle of endogenous, recursive policy prefer-
ences. In the present context, this proﬁle is U(ωt;ψ).
The political ﬁxed problem is resolved in Krusell, et. al., and in most of the politico-
economic literature that followed, by assuming either that there are only two types of agents,
or that pt is uni-dimensional and stage game preferences have a special form to generate single
peaked recursive preferences.7
Unfortunately, single peakedness will not suﬃce if both the policy and the political institu-
tion itself are part of the decision problem. We now introduce a parameter θt that determines
the political institution. In this Section, suppose that θt ∈{ θ1,θ 2} where θt = θ1 means that
the policy is determined by a majority vote, and θt = θ2 means that the policy is imposed by
a “dictator,” whom we assume to be individual i = 1. The “political state” θt is then distinct
from the payoﬀ-relevant “economic” state ωt. The political state summarizes the political
process by which public decisions are made. In particular, the political state θt determines
the political rule, in this case either majority rule or dictatorship, for choosing both the policy
pt and the subsequent political state, θt+1.
Again, omit the private sector. Now, the public sector decision includes both the choice
of current policy and the choice of institution for the following period. Keeping notation
the same whenever possible, the policy strategy ψ determines policy pt = ψ(ωt,θ t) given the
current economic and political state. An institutional strategy µ is a mapping that determines
the future political state θt+1 = µ(ωt,θ t). The institutional strategy describes a recursive
process of institutional change. The rule in period t produces the new rule for period t +1 .
The public sector decision each period is a pair (pt,θ t+1).
6Their work builds on an older literature on time consistent policy. See Persson and Tabellini (2001) and
Hassler, et. al. (2003) for references.
7A few exceptions to these two standards sets of conditions are mentioned below.
5To save on notation, let st =( ωt,θ t) be the composite state. An individual’s payoﬀ now is
Ui(st; ψ,µ )(pt,θ t+1) ≡ (1 − δ)ui(ωt,p t)+δ
Z
Vi(st+1; ψ,µ )dq(ωt+1| ωt,p t) (3)
If st =( ωt,θ 1), then the set C(U(st;ψ,µ ),s t), now indexed by state st, describes the set of
Condorcet Winning public decisions as before. However, if st =( ωt,θ 2), then C(U(st;ψ,µ ),s t)
describes the public sector decisions that maximize the dictator’s payoﬀ function U1(st;ψ,µ )(·).
The political ﬁxed point problem is restated as
(ψ(st),µ(st)) ∈ C(U(st; ψ,µ ),s t), ∀st (4)
The ﬁxed point problems (2) and (4) are distinct in several respects. In (2), the map
admits a ﬁxed point in the space of policy strategies. Since the institution — majority voting
— was ﬁxed, the recursive payoﬀ proﬁles were required to admit Condorcet Winners for each
economic state ω. This is a nontrivial problem by itself. However, the mapping in (4) varies
by institutional state, θt, as well as by economic state ωt, and so we further require that (4)
admits solutions for all political aggregation rules in some feasible set.
This ﬁxed point problem in institutions is reminiscent of “self-selected rules” in the static
social choice models of Koray (2000) and Barbera and Jackson (2000), and also the inﬁnite
regress model of choice of rules by Lagunoﬀ (1992). These all posit social orderings on the
rules themselves based on the outcomes that these rules prescribe. The present model diﬀers
from these in that institutional choice occurs in real time. This makes possible an analysis of
explicit dynamics of change. Additionally, the present model is more concrete, distinguishing
between public and private sector decisions (in the next Section). Once a private sector is
introduced, then (4) must hold for individuals’ private decision rules that best respond to
public sector decisions and to each other in all states.
Notice, ﬁnally, that the decision problem is necessarily multi-dimensional. Hence, the
simplest Median Voter Theorems are not useful for solving (4). A few papers examine dynamic
models of voting that speciﬁcally allow for multi-dimensional choice spaces (though keeping the
voting mechanism ﬁxed). These include Bernheim and Nataraj (2002), Kalandrakis (2002),
and Banks and Duggan (2003). Here, the political ﬁxed point problem is compounded by
fact that diﬀerent institutions each have possibly distinct requirements for achieving recursive
consistency. The sequel addresses this problem in fuller generality.
3 The General Model
In general, the feasible set of political institutions can easily include more than merely “pure
dictatorship” and “pure democracy”. Here we introduce the general model. Our speciﬁcation
6includes private (individual) decisions as well as public ones, and a fairly arbitrary space of
political institutions. Let Θ denote an index set of feasible institutions. Let S =Ω× Θ
denote the composite state space. In what follows, we will ﬁnd it useful to adopt the standard
convention and drop time subscripts, using instead the notation of primes, e.g., θ0 to denote
subsequent period’s variables, θt+1, and so on. Let |·|denote the cardinality of a set.
3.1 Political Rules
For expositional reasons, we ﬁrst describe the political institutions that aggregate arbitrary
proﬁles of payoﬀ functions without reference to the dynamic game. Let vi denote an arbi-
trary function expressing the payoﬀ vi(p,θ0) over current policy p and next period’s political
state, θ0. One example is the dynamic model of the previous section whereby vi(p,θ0)=
Ui(s; ψ,µ )(p,θ0). Let V denote the set of all proﬁles, v =( v1,...,v n), of such payoﬀ func-
tions.
A class of political rules corresponds to a state-contingent social choice correspondence,
C : V×S →→ P × Θ,
that associates to each state s and each payoﬀ proﬁle v, a set C(v,s) of public decisions. If
(p,θ0) ∈ C(v,s), then (p,θ0) is a feasible public decision under C. Each particular political
rule in the class C is given by C(·,s). Examples of political rules include:
(i) A Time Consistent Planner The standard benchmark model for dynamic optimal (Ram-
sey) policy formation is of a time consistent government or social planner. The set Θ
is a singleton set {θ} and θ ∈ IR
n
+ is a vector that determines the welfare weights in




(ii) Supermajority rules. The political state identiﬁes the fraction, θ ≥ 1/2 of individuals
required to pass a public decision. A super-majority voting rule therefore determines
which supermajority rule is used in the future: formally Θ ⊂ (.5,1] and for each s =
(ω,θ), let (p,θ0) ∈ C(v,s) if for all (ˆ p, ˆ θ0)
|{i ∈ I : vi(ˆ p, ˆ θ
0) >v i(p,θ
0)}| ≤ θn
(iii) Voting rights. The political state θ identiﬁes the subset of individuals who currently
possess the right to vote (the voting franchise). The chosen public decision is the one
that is majority preferred within this restricted group. Each restricted voting franchise
today uses a majority vote to determine what group of individuals has the right to vote
tomorrow: formally, Θ ⊇ 2I, and let (p,θ0) ∈ C(v,s) if for all (ˆ p, ˆ θ0),






7(iv) The scope of public sector decisions. The political state identiﬁes the domain of public
decisions. Let θ ⊂ P so that θ denotes the set of feasible policies. Let (p,θ0) ∈ C(v,s)
if p ∈ θ and for all (ˆ p, ˆ θ0) satisfying ˆ p ∈ θ,






Although these are all examples in which the procedure for changing policy is the same as
that which changes institutions, this need not be the case. Consider the following modiﬁcation
of (ii). The political state is θ =( θa,θ b), whereby θa is the supermajority required to determine
policy, while θb is the supermajority required to determine the subsequent rule. Then (p,θ0) ∈
C(v,s) if, for all (ˆ p, ˆ θ0), EITHER
|{i ∈ I : vi(ˆ p, ˆ θ
0) >v i(p, ˆ θ
0)}| ≤ θan OR |{i ∈ I : vi(ˆ p, ˆ θ
0) >v i(ˆ p,θ
0)}| ≤ θbn
Hence, the framework allows for provisions, such as those in the U.S. Constitution, that
distinguish rules for changing policy from rules for changing rules.
Call a class of rules C single valued if for each v ∈Vand for each s, there exists a (p,θ0)
pair such that C(v,s)={(p,θ0)}. In many cases, the political rules of interest are those that
can rationalized by some social welfare criterion. Formally, a class of rules C is (partially)
rationalized by a social welfare function F :I R
n × S → IR i f F is weakly increasing in each





When C(·) describes a voting rule in every state (e.g., Examples (ii) and (iii) above), then
there are two well known conditions under which the public decisions under C are partially
rationalized by the preferences of at least one pivotal voter. The ﬁrst is the standard restriction
to single peaked preferences on a one dimensional decisions space.8 The second is the order
restriction property of Rothstein (1990). Similar results can be found in the application of
single crossing properties by Roberts (1977) and by Gans and Smart (1996).
3.2 Dynamic Political Games
Recall that I = {1,...,n} is the set of individuals in this society. P is the set of feasible policies
in each period, and S =Ω× Θ is the composite state space. Let s0 =( ω0,θ 0) denote the
initial state. We now introduce private sector decisions. Let eit denote i’s private decision at
date t, chosen from a feasible set E. A proﬁle of private decisions is et =( e1t,...,e nt ). These
decisions may capture any number of activities, including labor eﬀort, savings, or investment
activities. They may also include “non-economic” activities such as religious worship or one’s
participation in a violent revolt.
8See Arrow (1951) and Black (1958).
8To express the dependence of payoﬀs and technology in private sector decisions, let ui(ωt,e t,p t)
denote i’s stage payoﬀ and let q(B| ωt,e t,p t) denote the probability that ωt+1 belongs to the
(Borel measurable) subset B ⊆ Ω, given the economic state ωt, the private decision proﬁle






t(1 − δ) ui(ωt,e t,p t )
#
. (5)
Deﬁne a Dynamic Political Game (DPG) to be the collection
G ≡h (ui)i∈I,q,E,P,Ω, Θ,C, s 0i
The class of dynamic political games (DPGs) constitutes a broad set of problems in which
institutional changes occur endogenously and incrementally. The speciﬁcation of a DPG
includes an “economic structure” in form of (ui)i∈I,q,E,P and Ω. This part is found in any
standard stochastic game. The addition is the “political structure” given by Θ and C. The
class of political rules is described by operator C. The operator C is deﬁned on the proﬁles
of dynamic recursive payoﬀs in each state. In turn, these dynamic payoﬀs depend on future
strategies (see, for example, Equation (3) in the previous Section) which are deﬁned explicitly
in Section 3.3. The initial state s0 completes the speciﬁcation.
For tractability, we restrict attention to dynamic political games that satisfy one of the
following two exclusive sets of assumptions.
(A1) Θ is a ﬁnite set. P and E are compact, convex subsets of Euclidian spaces, and Ω is a
convex subset of a Euclidian space; the payoﬀ function ui for each i is continuous and
uniformly bounded above by some K>0; for each (ω,e,p), q(·| ω,e,p) admits a norm
continuous, conditional density f(·| ω,e,p) with respect to a probability measure η.
(A1’) Θ, E, P and Ω are all ﬁnite sets.
Unless otherwise stated, all the subsequent results assume that either (A1) or (A1’) holds.
The continuity and boundedness assumptions in (A1) are fairly standard in existence
Theorems of Markov equilibria in stochastic games.9 However, they are not harmless. In
particular, they imply that dynamic payoﬀs are bounded by K, and, more importantly, that
transitions cannot be deterministic. Dutta and Sundaram (1994) contains a cogent discussion
of the role of these assumptions in existence results.
9See, for example, Mertens and Parthasarathy (1987), Dutta and Sundaram (1994), Amir (1996), Curtat
(1996), and Horst (2003).
93.3 Strategies and Equilibrium
To make the theory tractable, we restrict attention to Markov strategies. Such strategies only
encode the payoﬀ-relevant states of the game. Consequently, individuals are not required to
coordinate on the history of past play.
Recall that ψ : S → P and µ : S → Θ describe the policy and institutional strategies,
respectively. Together they constitute the public sector strategies.A private sector strategy
for individual i is a function σi : S → Ei that prescribes private action eit = σi(st) in state st.
Let σ =( σ1,...,σ n). The strategy proﬁle is therefore summarized by the triple
private sector proﬁle
| {z } policy strategy
| {z } institutional strategy
| {z }
π ≡ ( σ, ψ, µ )
An individual deviation from π is denoted by, for example, π\σi. For any st =( ωt,θ t) the
payoﬀ to citizen i in proﬁle π at date t is deﬁned recursively by:
Vi(st; π)=( 1 − δ)ui(ωt,σ(st),ψ(st))+δ
Z
Vi(ωt+1,µ(st);π)dq(ωt+1| ωt,σ(st),ψ(st) ) (6)
The function V depends on and varies with arbitrary Markov strategy proﬁles π =( σ,ψ,µ ).
Along an equilibrium path (deﬁned below), the function Vi deﬁnes a Bellman’s equation for
citizen i. Given any strategy π, and any state st at date t, an individual’s public payoﬀ
function Ui(st,π):P × Θ → I R is deﬁned by
Ui(st,π)(pt,θ t+1) ≡ (1 − δ)ui(ωt,σ(st),p t)+δ
Z
Vi(ωt+1,θ t+1;π)dq(ωt+1| ωt,σ(st),p t ) (7)
Let U(st,π)=( Ui(st,π)) i∈I. We now drop time subscripts and deﬁne an equilibrium for any
dynamic political game.
Deﬁnition 1 An Equilibrium of a dynamic political game, G, is a proﬁle π =( σ,ψ,µ )o f
Markov strategies such that for all states s =( ω,θ),
(a) Private decision rationality: For each citizen i, and each private decision rule, ˆ σi,
Vi(s; π) ≥ Vi(s; π\ˆ σi ) (8)
(b) Existence of political ﬁxed points: The public decision pair (ψ(s),µ(s) ) satisﬁes
(ψ(s),µ(s)) ∈ C (U(s,π),s) (9)
10Part (a) is the standard Markov Perfection property of a stochastic game. Private sector
actions must be individually optimal in each state. Part (b) asserts the existence of political
ﬁxed points. Public sector decisions are required to be consistent with political rules in the
class C. In keeping with the standard deﬁnition of a stochastic game, both types of decisions
are simultaneous. Therefore, an equilibrium of a DPG requires both Markov Perfection from
individuals’ private sector choices and recursive consistency of public sector choices with a
political rule.
Since this equilibrium concept departs from Nash equilibrium, it deserves further comment.
One could make a reasonable case that, instead of modelling political rules in reduced form as
social choice rules (e.g., Condorcet Winners to represent majority voting), all political rules
should be explicitly modelled as a part of a noncooperative game. The argument goes that
endogenous institutions can arise as Nash equilibrium outcomes of a standard stochastic game.
The issue then becomes: which game? While there are agreed upon canonical social choice
representations of voting, there are fewer in non-cooperative games.10 Hence, the trade-oﬀ is
one of “explicitness” versus “representativeness.” The approach taken here favors the latter.11
4 Equilibrium Existence and Political Fixed Points
There are two main problems in establishing equilibrium existence. First, there is the “stan-
dard” existence problem in all stochastic games. This problem amounts to ﬁnding a solution
to Part (a) in the equilibrium deﬁnition. For even if there were no public decisions (or if C
was constant in all states), known existence results generally employ restrictive conditions on
feasible choice sets, preferences, and transition technology. Second, one must address the po-
litical ﬁxed point problem as expressed in Part (b) of the equilibrium deﬁnition. The problem
of ﬁnding political ﬁxed points was outlined in Section 2. Both problems must be solved in
order for a DPG to admit equilibria. However, while the standard existence problem applies
to all stochastic games, the political ﬁxed problem is speciﬁc to dynamic political games. We
address the speciﬁc problem ﬁrst.
4.1 Dynamically Consistent Rules
Recall that most of the common political rules of interest are those that are rationalized or
partially rationalized by social welfare functions. Among these, the most obvious ones satisfy
10Arguably, the closest to a canonical model among non-cooperative games is the endogenous candidate
model of Besley and Coate (1997) and Osborne and Slivinsky (1996). Even in their model, however, there are
reasonable, alternative speciﬁcations of how candidates could emerge.
11It should also be noted that existence Theorems in this paper apply to purely noncooperative games as a
special case.
11a dynamic consistency requirement. Dynamic consistency, long taken for granted in decision
models, presumes that future decision makers’ points of view coincide with that of the present
decision maker if the latter were to called upon to make the decision in that future period.
A large literature has emerged recently to evaluate dynamically inconsistent decision-making
from an individual’s perspective. Nevertheless, most dynamic models of government policy
maintain assumptions of dynamically consistency.12
For our purposes, the following deﬁnition will be used in the analysis. Consider any time
separable payoﬀ functions of the form, v(p,θ0)=( 1− δ)v1(p)+δ
R
ω0 v2(ω0,θ 0)dη. (Clearly,
dynamic payoﬀs in the present model satisfy this requirement). A class of political rules, C,
will be said to be dynamically consistent if it is partially rationalized by a continuous social


























This deﬁnition embodies two critical properties. First, F is time and state separable and
linearly homogeneous in the discount weights (1−δ,δ).13 Second, F does not vary directly with
the economic state, i.e, F(·,s )=F(·,θ ). Consequently, each political state θ is uniquely
associated with a political rule. Both properties are needed to guarantee that the rate of
intertemporal substitution between the current period payoﬀ and next period coincides with
the rate of substitution between any other pair of successive payoﬀ-dates. Example (i) in
the previous Section is clearly dynamically consistent. However, Examples (ii)-(iv) are only
dynamically consistent in particular circumstances. The results below provide greater detail
about the nature of these circumstances.
The following result asserts that dynamic consistency of the political rule is suﬃcient for
existence of political ﬁxed points.
Theorem 1 Suppose in a dynamic political game G, either Assumption (A1) or (A1’) holds,
and the class C is dynamically consistent. Then for any proﬁle, σ, of private sector decision
rules, the game admits political ﬁxed points.
The proof below shows ﬁrst that political ﬁxed points correspond to ﬁxed points in value
function space of the associated “Bellman’s equation.” A solution to the Bellman’s equation
exists iﬀ there is a political ﬁxed point. A Contraction Mapping argument then completes the
proof.
12The two exceptions I am aware of are Krusell, Kuruscu, and Smith (2002) and Lagunoﬀ (2004a).
13Broader deﬁnitions of dynamic consistency do not require linear homogeneity in the discount factor. The
results here may also be amenable to a more general deﬁnition, but at a cost in transparency.
12Proof Let W : S → [0,K]n be a proﬁle of bounded, measurable continuation payoﬀ functions.
We call a continuation function W feasible if W = V (·,π) for some strategy proﬁle, π. Let W
denote the set of feasible continuations. By a slight abuse of our previous notation, we deﬁne
the recursive public payoﬀ with an arbitrary continuation W in (7) to
Ui(s; σ,W)(p,θ






We prove ﬁrst that political ﬁxed points are associated with the ﬁxed points (in value
function space) of the associated Bellman’s mapping. Speciﬁcally, let G be a dynamic political
game in which rule C is partially rationalized by a continuous function F. For each σ ∈ Σ,




p,θ0 F (U(s; σ,W)(p,θ
0),s ) (12)
Fix σ and let ˆ W be a ﬁxed point of the Bellman’s operator deﬁned in (11). Then we show
that the pair ( ˆ ψ,ˆ µ) that solves (12) for W = ˆ W, and the pair constitutes a political ﬁxed







U(s; σ, ˆ W)(ˆ ψ(s), ˆ µ(s)),s
￿
, ∀s
By our earlier (abuse of) notation, U(s; σ, ˆ W)=U(s; σ, ˆ ψ,ˆ µ). If C is either partially or fully
rationalized by F, then ( ˆ ψ,ˆ µ) ∈ C(U(s; σ, ˆ ψ, ˆ µ),s ), and so ( ˆ ψ,ˆ µ) is a political ﬁxed point.
Next, we prove that if C is fully rationalized by F, then the converse holds: namely, for
every political ﬁxed point ( ˆ ψ, ˆ µ), the corresponding value ˆ W of the Bellman’s operator is a
ﬁxed point of (11). Suppose then that C is fully rationalized by F and let ( ˆ ψ,ˆ µ) be a political
ﬁxed point. Then
(ˆ ψ, ˆ µ) ∈ C(U(s;σ, ˆ ψ,ˆ µ),s ) = argmax
p,θ0 F
￿
U(s; σ,V (·;σ, ˆ ψ, ˆ µ))(p,θ
0),s
￿
By deﬁnition, V (·;σ, ˆ ψ,ˆ µ) is a ﬁxed point of the Bellman operator.
We prove the remainder of the result as follows. Fix an arbitrary σ and let W be any
bounded continuation proﬁle, and by our abuse of notation, write U(s,σ,W). Since C is
















13Notice that under either (A1) or (A1’), (BW) in nonempty valued. It is easy to very that
B satisﬁes two suﬃcient conditions, discounting and monotonicity, in a well known result
of Blackwell (1965), implying that B is a contraction. Applying the Contraction Mapping
Theorem, B has a ﬁxed point, ˆ W. By our previous argument relating ﬁxed points in value
space with those in strategy space, the conclusion follows.
Although dynamic consistent rules solve the political ﬁxed point problem, most common
rules are not dynamically consistent without further restrictions. Signiﬁcantly, the Condorcet
rule in Section 2, for example, is only dynamically consistent when its policies coincide with
those of a median voter whose identity does not vary across states. What guarantees such a
condition? We ﬁnd that a simple restriction on stage game payoﬀs — a restriction similar to
Grandmont’s (1978) Intermediate Preference Assumption — suﬃces for any voting rule to be
dynamic consistent.
Formally, C is a class of voting rules if there is a nonempty collection D⊆2I×2I satisfying:
for each v, θ, and (p,θ0), (p,θ0) ∈ C(v,θ)i ﬀ∀(ˆ p, ˆ θ0), ∃(D1,D 2) ∈Dsuch that,
vi(p,θ0) >v i(ˆ p, ˆ θ0), ∀i ∈ D1
and vi(p,θ0) ≥ vi(ˆ p, ˆ θ0), ∀i ∈ D2
Informally, D denotes the ordered sets consisting of strictly and weakly decisive coalitions
of individuals. These coalitions deﬁne the sets of individuals that have veto power over all
public decisions. Politically feasible decisions require the consent of each member of some
decisive coalition. This deﬁnition is fairly standard although there are a number of, mostly
equivalent, deﬁnitions. (See Austen-Smith and Banks (1999) ).
Theorem 2 Suppose that G is a dynamic political game in which either Assumption (A1) or
(A1’) holds. Suppose that C is a class of voting rules and that the stage game payoﬀs admit
the aﬃne preference representation,
ui(ω,e,p)=k(i)h(ω,e,p)+g(ω,e,p) (14)
all i, where k is an increasing, real valued function. Then C is dynamically consistent.
It is a simple exercise to show that recursive preferences admit an aﬃne representation
if stage game payoﬀs do. Moreover, the ordering on I as given by k(·) is preserved across
all states. Hence, these preferences satisfy the order restriction property of Rothstein (1990).
Rothstein’s Theorem can therefore be applied to show that C is partially rationalized by
at least one individual’s recursive payoﬀ function. The details of the argument are in the
14Appendix. Combining Theorems 1 and 2, if G is a DPG in which (14) is satisﬁed and C is a
class of voting rules, then G admits a political ﬁxed point.
Even with the restriction to aﬃne preferences, a strong case can be made that many of
the political rules observed in the world today are not voting rules and, in fact, are dynam-
ically inconsistent. Two sources of dynamic inconsistency are of particular interest. First,
dynamically inconsistent choices arise because the political rules vary with economic states
such as the income distribution. Wealth-weighted “voting” rules satisfy this property. A pure
example of this is the wealth-is-power rule examined by Jordan (2002). In its simplest form,
policies are entirely determined by those with the most aggregate wealth.
(v) Wealth-is-Power Let Θ be a degenerate singleton {θ}. For each state s =( ω,θ), let the
economic state determine distribution of wealth, i.e, ω =( ω1,...,ω n). The Wealth-is-







where M = {i ∈ I : vi(ˆ p,θ) >v i(p,θ)}.
Jordan (2002) shows that outcomes of the wealth-is-power rule correspond to the core of
a certain cooperative game. He characterizes the set of wealth distributions that generate
nonempty core, or in our context, generate political ﬁxed points. It is easy to see that under
certain types of technological shocks, dynamic inconsistencies can occur. Reversals over time
in the aggregate wealth of two mutually exclusive groups of individuals create conﬂicts between
the present and future incarnations of the political aggregation process.
A second form of dynamic inconsistency arises because the political rules are not separable.
An example is a weighted Rawlsian social choice rule under which society wishes to maximize
the welfare of the person whose weighted payoﬀ makes him least well oﬀ.










Even if the economic state is degenerate, i.e., Ω = {ω}, it is not generally true under the
weighted Rawlsian rule that the least well oﬀ individual also has the least well oﬀ continuation
payoﬀ next period. Hence, the rate of substitution between today and period t + 1 diﬀers
possibly from rate of substitution between t + 1 and t +2 .
Clearly, each of these rules may induce dynamically inconsistent public sector decisions.
It less clear whether, and to what extent, they pose diﬃculties in the political ﬁxed point
15problem. Of the two, wealth-weighted voting seems more problematic. Jordan (2002) shows,
for instance, that fairly extreme wealth distributions are required to avoid cycles in the wealth-
is-power rule even in static problems and with aﬃne preferences. For now, we leave this for
future research and proceed to the general existence problem.
4.2 Extension to Mixed Strategies: A Finite Existence Theorem
Unfortunately, even if the DPG admits political ﬁxed points, a solution to the general existence
problem is not guaranteed. The simplest way to resolve the existence issue is to assume that
all sets, E, P, Ω and Θ are ﬁnite (i.e., Assumption (A1’) ). Then the analysis must be
extended to allow for mixed strategies. The extension is fairly straightforward. Note that
since the political rule C makes a joint determination of p and θ0, it must be extended to the
set ∆(P × Θ) of correlated distributions.
First, represent the public sector strategies for p and θ0 as a pair ψ∗ and µ∗ such that
µ∗ : S → ∆(θ) where µ∗(θ0|s) is the probability of θ0 given s, and ψ∗ : S × Θ → ∆(P) where
ψ∗(p|s,θ0) denotes the conditional probability of p given s and the realized θ0. Given s, the
associate mixed action in ∆(P ×Θ) is expressed as (ψ∗×µ∗)(s). Next, let σ∗
i (ei|s) denote the
conditional probability of private decision ei given s. A proﬁle of mixed Markov strategies is




















Theorem 3 Suppose in any dynamic political game satisfying (A1’) the class C of political
rules is dynamically consistent. Then there exists an equilibrium π∗ =( σ∗,ψ∗ × µ∗) in mixed
Markov strategies.
In the particular case of a voting rule, equilibria exist if stage game preferences admit
aﬃne representations. The argument is straightforward. Since F is dynamically consistent,
then for any political state θ, we can treat the social welfare function F(·,θ) in state θ as a
“player” in a standard dynamic game. This player has a set of feasible pure actions equal to
P ×Θi fθ is the current rule, and is equal to the empty set ∅ if θ is not. This player then has
dynamic preferences (in pure strategies) given by,







16Viewed in this way, the DPG can be transformed into a standard, ﬁnite stochastic game
with n + |Θ| players. At this point, the Theorem 3 is just an application of a standard
result, namely, that stochastic games with ﬁnite actions sets and ﬁnite states admit in mixed
strategies Markov Perfect equilibria. We therefore omit remainder of the proof.
4.3 A Smooth Existence Theorem
While the ﬁnite existence theorem is useful in many contexts, it is limited in a number of
ways. First, it does not apply to many economically relevant environments. In many such
environments, the natural economic states are capital stocks which may be unboundedly
inﬁnite.
Second, practical applications demand more structure. In most dynamic models of policy,
equilibria are characterized by their Euler equations. These Euler equations are more elaborate
than those in single agent problems. Roughly, Euler equations in DPGs have extra terms due
the intertemporal eﬀects that other agents’ future policy functions have on a decision maker’s
policy decision in the current period. These extra terms involve higher order diﬀerential
equations of future policy functions.14 Euler equation characterizations in dynamic political
models are found in Klein, Krusell, and Rios-Rull (2002) and Jack and Lagunoﬀ (2003). The
latter examines a particular class of DPG in which voting rights are endogenously determined.
The former examine a politico-economic model of government ﬁscal policy. Klein, Krusell,
and Rios-Rull also develop computationally tractable techniques for obtaining optimal policies
from “Generalized” Euler equations in their model.15
For these reasons, it is highly desirable to ﬁnd conditions on DPGs for which smooth
Markov equilibria exist. Until recently, not much was known about smooth Markov equilibria
even in standard stochastic games. An elegant result of Horst (2003) asserts existence of
Lipschitz-continuous (hence, almost everywhere smooth) Markov Perfect equilibria in dynamic
games. His result makes use of a “moderate social inﬂuence” (MSI) assumption whereby the
interactions between players are suﬃciently weak. The MSI assumption apparently originates
from a restriction on payoﬀs in a local interaction model of Horst and Scheinkman (2002). The
idea, roughly, is that one’s own actions have a relatively greater eﬀect on one’s own marginal
dynamic payoﬀ than those of all other individuals combined. MSI overcomes a common
problem in dynamic games. Generally, continuity of each player’s “Bellman’s” operator fails
because it conﬂicts with conditions required for compactness of the function space to which
the operator applies. One can recover continuity of the Bellman operator if there are uniform,
14See Basar and Olsder (1999) for a general formulation.
15Strictly speaking, politico-economic models are hybrids in the sense that the price mechanism in these
models endogenously constrains one’s feasible actions, and so out-of-equilibrium behavior is not deﬁned. Nev-
ertheless, their techniques are likely adaptable to dynamic game environments if smooth Markov equilibria
exist.
17Lipschitzian bounds on the players’ marginal best replies in each state in the dynamic game.
The MSI assumption establishes existence of such bounds.
We combine elements of Horst’s result, including the MSI assumption, with earlier results
on political ﬁxed points to show that dynamic political games with dynamically consistent
rules admit equilibria that are almost everywhere smooth in the economic state, ω.
To make sense of formal assumptions below, we adopt the following deﬁnitions and nota-
tional conventions. First, endow the class of (smooth) C∞ functions, H :I R
` → IR
k, with the
topology of C∞-uniform convergence on compacta. Formally, Hm → H in this topology if,
for any compact set Y ⊂ IR
`, {Hm} converges to HC ∞-uniformly on Y (i.e., for each r and
each rth partial derivative, ||DrHm −DrH||r → 0o nY ).16 The function H is C∞-uniformly
bounded if it is smooth and there is some some ﬁnite number L>0 that uniformly bounds
H and bounds all its higher order derivatives in sup norm.
Next, deﬁne a real valued function, g :I R
` → IR t o b e α-concave with α>0i fg(x)+1
2α||x||2
is concave.17 Notice that α = 0 corresponds to the standard deﬁnition of concavity. When α>
0, then α-concavity is obviously a stronger curvature condition. α-concavity is used elsewhere
in the literature to bound higher order derivatives via the Implicit Function Theorem. It is
used here for a similar purpose.
Finally, given some ￿>0, we let E￿ and P ￿ denote interior neighborhoods of E and P,
respectively, such that any point e ∈ E￿ or p ∈ P ￿ is ￿ in distance away from the respective
boundaries in E and P.
In addition to Assumption (A1), the following assumptions on the dynamic political game
will be used.
(A2) (Concavity) There is an αi > 0 such that for each ω, ui is αi-concave in the private and
policy decision pair, (ei,p) pair.
(A3) (Uniform Bounds) There is an L>0 such that for each i, the payoﬀ function ui is smooth
and C∞-uniformly bounded by L>K(recall that K is the bound on ui). There is also
an M>0 such that for each ω0 and each ω, the conditional density f(ω0| ω,·), as a
function of decisions (e,p), is assumed to be C∞-uniformly bounded by M.
16The sup norm, || · ||r on the rth derivative DrH :I R
` → IR









In this notation, || · ||0 is the standard sup norm on H.
17An equivalent deﬁnition is: g is α-concave if the matrix D2g +αI, with I denoting the identity matrix, is
negative semi-deﬁnite.
18(A4) (Moderate Social Inﬂuence) There exists a 0 <γ<1 such that for all i, and all
s =( ω,θ),
(1 − δ)L + δKM
αi
≤ γ(1 − δ).
(A5) (Interiority) There exists an ￿>0 such that for each i, each e−i, and each pair of
economic states ω and ω0, both ui(ω,e−i,·), and f(ω0|ω,·) achieve their upper bounds
on E￿ × P ￿.
Assumptions (A2) and (A3) are used to bound the marginal best replies uniformly over all
states and continuations. Assumption (A4) is the Moderate Social Inﬂuence (MSI) assumption
adapted from Horst (2003) and Horst and Scheinkman (2002). Assumption (A5) ensures
interior solutions in best replies.
Theorem 4 Let G be any dynamic political game satisfying (A1)-(A5). Suppose the class of
political rules C is dynamically consistent and rationalized by a smooth function F on IR
n.
Then G admits an equilibrium, π =( σ,ψ,µ ∗), in which σ and ψ are pure Markov strategies
and µ∗ is a mixed Markov strategy, all of which are almost everywhere smooth in the economic
state ω.
The Proof below has two main steps. First, we establish existence of a smooth Markov
equilibrium for the game restricted to only private decisions. With this restriction, the game
conforms to an ordinary stochastic game. To an extent (though not completely), this step
adapts many of the arguments from Horst’s proof. In particular, we adapt the methodology
of showing that the dynamic game reduces to a series of one-shot auxiliary games all of which
have smooth Nash equilibria in the economic state.18 The smoothness requires both the MSI
assumption and an older result of Montrucchio (1987) who shows that dynamic, single agent
decision problems have solutions that are Lipschitzian functions of the state.
Horst ﬁrst applies a ﬁxed point argument for bounded state spaces. These ﬁxed points are
Markov equilibria of the game with bounded states. He then extends the result by taking a
uniform limit of ﬁxed points as the bound is relaxed. The present argument, however, takes
a direct approach by applying the ﬁxed point argument directly on the full state space.
However, the truly distinctive step of our proof is to show that any dynamic political game
with a dynamically consistent class C maps into an ordinary stochastic game. By using the set
of rules to augment the set of players, public sector decisions may be transformed into private
decisions taken by these additional players. Assumptions (A1)-(A5) in the original game are
18This same methodology is common in other stochastic game equilibrium existence results. See, for example,
Mertens and Parthasarathy (1987), Dutta and Sundaram (1994), Amir (1996), and Curtat (1996).
19shown to apply to the new stochastic game. It is not obvious that this transformation can be
done if political rules are dynamically inconsistent.
Proof of Theorem 4 The steps outlined informally above are formalized here.
Step 1. The Restriction to Private Decisions
We ﬁrst prove an existence Theorem without public decisions. That is, consider the stan-
dard dynamic game with only private decisions, ei. In what follows, we exclude the public
decision component from notation altogether. That is, we ﬁrst assume that stage game payoﬀs
are given by ui(ω,e) while the density is given by f(ω0| ω,e). Let ¯ G = h(ui)i∈I,Ω,q,E,ω 0;i
denote the game with only private decisions. Restating the result, we ﬁrst wish to prove
Theorem A Let ¯ G denote a dynamic game with only private decisions. Suppose ¯ G satisﬁes
(A1)-(A5). Then the game has a Markov Perfect equilibrium σ that is smooth on Ω.
The Proof of Theorem A constitutes the remainder of Step 1. Let X denote the set of all
uniformly bounded, Lipschitz continuous functions, x :Ω→ [0,K)n with uniform Lipschitz
bound given by L. Standard results show that X is compact in the topology of uniform
convergence on compacta (see, for example, Mas Colell (1985, Theorem K.2.2). For each such
function x ∈X, deﬁne a one shot game by the payoﬀs,





for each i. Then let H =( Hi)n
i=1 be the vector valued function with components deﬁned by
(16).
Lemma 1 For each state ω and each continuation value x ∈X , the one shot game deﬁned
by payoﬀ proﬁle, H(ω,·,x ), has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium proﬁle,
(¯ σ1(ω,x),...,¯ σn(ω,x))
of private decisions. The proﬁle ¯ σ is smooth with uniformly bounded ﬁrst derivatives in ω,
and is uniformly bounded and continuous in x.
The proof of this and all subsequent Lemmatta are contained in the Appendix. Using
Lemma 1, let ¯ σ be the map that deﬁnes the unique Nash equilibrium ¯ σ(ω,x) for the one shot
game with payoﬀs, Hi(ω,e,x),i=1 ,...,n.
Lemma 2 The equilibrium payoﬀ function Hi(·, ¯ σ(·),x) is smooth with a uniformly bounded
ﬁrst derivative in ω, and with the uniform bound applying across all x.
20Now deﬁne the operator, T deﬁned on X n by
(Tx)i(ω)=Hi(ω,¯ σ(ω,x),x)
for each i =1 ,...,n, or, in other words,
(Tx)(ω)=( H1(ω,¯ σ(ω,x),x),...,H n(ω,¯ σ(ω,x),x) ) (17)
Clearly, from Lemma 2, the function (Tx)(·) is smooth in ω with uniformly bounded ﬁrst
derivative in ω over all ω and x. This implies, in particular, that Tx has uniform Lipschitz
bound. Consequently, Tx∈Xn for all V ∈Xn.
Lemma 3 T is a continuous operator.
Using Lemma 3, T maps continuously from the compact set X n into X n. By Schauder’s





Therefore, the proﬁle, σ∗ deﬁned by σ∗ ≡ ¯ σ(·,x ∗) is a smooth Markov Perfect equilibrium of
the dynamic political game without public decisions.
Step 2. The Extension to Public Decisions
Fix a dynamic political game G satisfying (A1)-(A5) with C dynamically consistent. We
now deﬁne a simple transformation of the full game, G, with public decisions to one with only
private decisions. Call this transformed game ¯ G and let ¯ G = h(¯ uj)j∈J,f, ¯ E,Ω,ω 0i.
The transformed game is deﬁned as follows. Suppose, without loss of generality that Θ
and I are disjoint sets, and let J = I ∪Θ. There are |J|×|Θ| players, each doubly indexed by
jθ, with j ∈ J and θ ∈ Θ. The interpretation of index jθ is that of Player j whose political
“type” (state) is θ. Formally, if τ = |Θ| then there are (n + τ)τ players. The private decision
space for Player jθ is
¯ Ejθ =

   
   
Ei f j ∈ I
P × ∆(Θ) if j ∈ Θ
Notationally, let ¯ eI =( ¯ ejθ)j∈I denoting the proﬁle of private actions of the “original”
players. Then for each j ∈ Θ, ¯ ejθ =( ¯ pjθ,β jθ), where βjθ is the (possibly) mixed strategy that
assigns probability βjθ(θ0)t oθ0 by Player jθ.
21By the dynamic consistency of C, each player jθ’s stage payoﬀ ¯ ujθ may be deﬁned by:
¯ ujθ(ω,¯ e)=

   
   
uj(ω,¯ eI, ¯ pθθ) if j ∈ I
F(u(ω,¯ eI, ¯ pθθ),j ) if j ∈ Θ
Without loss of generality, we can express a player’s stage game payoﬀ as ¯ ujθ(ω,¯ eI, ¯ pθθ).
Fix a vector β =( βθθ)θ∈Θ. Treating β as a part of the state, i.e, (ω,β), it is straightforward
to verify that the assumptions (A1)-(A5) are satisﬁed for the private decisions game ¯ G if they
are satisﬁed in the underlying game G.






Observe that ¯ x is uniformly bounded and Lipschitz continuous on Ω × ∆(Θ) with uniform
bound of, as before, L. It is also linear in β. Therefore, we can write the dynamic payoﬀ
function H from Theorem A as




0|ω,¯ eI, ¯ pθθ)dη
By Lemma 1, the payoﬀ Hjθ(ω,β,·, ¯ x) has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium,
(¯ σ(ω,β,¯ x), ¯ ψ(ω,β,¯ x) ) in “state” (ω,β,¯ x) where ¯ σjθ(ω,β,¯ x)=¯ ejθ is the private decision
of jθ when j ∈ I, and ¯ ψjθ(ω,β,¯ x)=¯ pjθ is the “private” decision when j ∈ Θ. Moreover, as
in the Lemma 2 Proof (see the Appendix), the pair (¯ σ, ¯ ψ) is smooth in ω and in β.
Next deﬁne
¯ µjθ(ω,¯ eI, ¯ pθθ, ¯ x) = argmax
β
Hjθ(ω,β,¯ eI, ¯ pθθ, ¯ x)
Notice that H is linear in β, and is a smooth and C∞-uniformly bounded function of (ω,¯ e)
(see Proof of Lemma 1 in the Appendix). Consequently, ¯ µ is upperhemicontinuous and almost
everywhere smooth in ¯ e and ω, and so by Kakutani’s Theorem, the map
(ω,¯ eI, ¯ pθθ,β,¯ x) 7→ (( ¯ σjθ(ω,β,¯ x))j∈I,(¯ ψjθ(ω,β,¯ x))j∈Θ,(¯ µjθ(ω,¯ eI, ¯ pθθ, ¯ x))j∈Θ )θ∈Θ
has a ﬁxed point
(¯ σ
∗





which is almost everywhere smooth in Ω. Let ¯ σ∗(ω,¯ x) ≡ (¯ σ∗
jθ(ω,¯ x))j∈I,θ∈Θ, ¯ ψ∗(ω,¯ x) ≡
( ¯ ψ∗
jθ(ω,¯ x))j∈Θ,θ∈Θ, and ¯ µ∗(ω,¯ x) ≡ (¯ µ∗
jθ(ω,¯ x))j∈Θ,θ∈Θ.
22The remainder of the argument now mimics that of Theorem A. Speciﬁcally, there exists
a ﬁxed point ¯ x∗ of an operator T deﬁned by
(T¯ x)jθ(ω)=Hjθ(ω,¯ σ
∗(ω,¯ x), ¯ ψ
∗(ω,¯ x), ¯ µ
∗(ω,¯ x), ¯ x)












This equilibrium is smooth in ω. We conclude the proof.
5 Conclusion
This paper introduces a class of stochastic games, called dynamic political games, in which
political institutions are instrumental objects of choice each period. In dynamic political
games, public sector decisions are determined by rules that aggregate proﬁles of dynamic
recursive preferences of individuals. The public sector decisions include parameters of future
political rules. Hence, rules used in date t + 1 are a part of the decision determined by rules
in date t.
We specify an equilibrium concept requiring that political aggregation be recursively con-
sistent. Although this concept diﬀers somewhat from Nash equilibrium, we argue that it is a
more canonical starting point for an analysis of dynamically endogenous institutions.
In this framework, Markov equilibria exist if all sets are ﬁnite, or if certain “smooth
uniformity” conditions are satisﬁed. Under the last types of conditions, we obtain a smooth
existence result: Markov equilibria exist that are smooth functions of the economic state.
The last result is of particular interest to applied political economists who characterize
dynamic equilibria by their Euler equations. Since Euler equations in dynamic games contain
higher order diﬀerentials of policy functions, existence of smooth equilibria, at least locally, is
important.
To obtain the existence results we show that DPGs must confront a diﬃcult “political ﬁxed
point problem” that arises in virtually any model of dynamic political aggregation. Because
a political rule must operate on dynamic preferences which, themselves, depend endogenously
on future strategies and rules, aggregation is well deﬁned now only if it is well deﬁned in all
future states and for all future rules. Along with standard technical conditions, dynamically
consistent rules evidently solve this problem.
Unfortunately, many historically relevant political institutions — wealth-weighted voting
for instance — are not dynamically consistent. Moreover, even simple rules such as voting
23rules are consistent in only under restrictive conditions such as preferences that admit aﬃne
representations. It is an open question whether, and to what extent dynamically inconsistent
classes of rules admit political ﬁxed points. We leave this issue for future research.
6 Appendix





































Clearly, the continuation proﬁle V (·,π) has an aﬃne representation of the same form as
stage payoﬀs in (14) for each π. Therefore,
















The proﬁle U(s,π) has also has an aﬃne representation. Because k is strictly increasing,
the collection of proﬁles, U(s,π)(·), in which Ui(s,π)(·) satisﬁes (18) for each i is order re-
stricted in the sense of Rothstein (1990), with respect to linear order on i induced by k (i.e.,
i ￿ j iﬀ k(i) >k (j)). Rothstein’s Theorem therefore implies that there exists at least one indi-
vidual m such that C is partially rationalized by the recursive preference function Um. That is,
Rothstein’s Theorem implies the existence of some m ∈ I such that F(U(s,π),s)=Um(s,π).
Notice that F satisﬁes the requirements of dynamic consistency. Moreover, by either Assump-




24has a solution, and so C is nonempty valued. We conclude the proof.
Proof of Lemma 1
Observe, ﬁrst, that by Assumptions (A1)-(A3), for each i, Hi is a smooth and C∞-uniformly
bounded function of (ω,e) (in the relative topology), with uniform bound given by
(1 − δ)L + δKM (19)
Clearly, this bound is independent of x since x is itself uniformly bounded by c. Consequently,
Hi is uniform bounded on its entire domain.
Next, we show that for each state ω, Hi is ¯ αi-concave in ei where ¯ αi =( 1 −δ)αi−δKM > 0.
To show this, we must show that for each ω, D2
eiHi(ω,¯ ex )+¯ αiI is negative semi deﬁnite.
To this end, ﬁx ω. Observe that by α-concavity on stage utility functions ui (Assumption
(A2)), and uniform boundedness of the conditional densities, f (Assumption (A3)), we have
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Since, by the Moderate Social Inﬂuence condition (Assumption (A4)), ¯ αi > 0, it follows
that Hi is ¯ α-concave. Consequently, by compactness of E (Assumption (A1)), and by the
smoothness and strict concavity of Hi in ei, the best response
gi(ω,e−i,x) ≡ argmax
ei∈E Hi(ω,e,x)
for each i is nonempty and single valued.
Consider the best response function, gi. By the Assumption (A5), gi(ω,e−i,x) deﬁnes a
critical point, i.e.,
DeiHi(ω,gi(ω,e−i,x),e −i,x)=0 .
Then by strict concavity of Hi, the Implicit Function Theorem implies that gi is a locally
smooth function in a neighborhood of (ω,e−i) (in the relative topology). In this neighborhood,





25Given the C∞-uniform bound on Hi given by (19), the ¯ αi-concavity of Hi implies that there
is a uniform bound on Dgi given by 1
¯ αi[(1 − δ)L + δKM]. Finally, since the choice of (ω,e−i)
was arbitrary, every such point is a regular point and so gi is smooth with uniformly bounded
ﬁrst derivative.
We now show that there is a unique Nash equilibrium, ¯ σ(ω,x) of the game with payoﬀs,
H(ω,·,x). Fixing ω and x, consider the best response map
e 7→ (g1(ω,e−1,x),...g n(ω,e−n,x)).
By the arguments above, the conditions for Brouwer’s Theorem are met and so this map has
a ﬁxed point. Since all best responses are interior — as shown above — the ﬁxed point must
be an interior point in En. To verify that this ﬁxed point is unique, it suﬃces to show that
the best response diﬀerence map
e 7→ e − (g1(ω,e−1,x),...g n(ω,e−n,x) ) (20)
has no critical points. It suﬃces then to show that the Jacobian of this map at diﬀerentiable
points is nonsingular. In turn, the Jacobian is nonsingular if it has a dominant diagonal. The
Jacobian has a dominant diagonal if
||De−igi||1 < 1, ∀i, (21)
at points (ω,e−i,x) of the best response map, gi. To verify (21), consider the best response
map, gi. Then we have:


















[(1 − δ)L + δKM]
< 1
(22)
The ﬁrst equality is the Implicit Function Theorem,19 the ﬁrst inequality follows from the de-
ﬁnition of ¯ α-concavity, the second follows from the Uniform Bounds Assumption (Assumption
(A3)), and the last follows from the MSI condition (Assumption(A4)).









, ∀j 6= i
26Next, we show that the proﬁle ¯ σ is smooth with uniformly bounded ﬁrst derivatives in
ω with the bound uniform across all x as well. Observe that the nonsingularity of (20)
implies that the unique Nash equilibrium ¯ σ(ω,x) is implicitly deﬁned by the Implicit Function
Theorem (IFT). In turn, the IFT also implies that Dω¯ σ is smooth and deﬁned by
Dω¯ σ =[ Deg]
−1[Dωg]
Note that the inverse [Deg]−1 exists and is uniformly bounded over all ω and all x by the
dominance diagonal condition, (22). Consequently, Dω¯ σ exists everywhere and is uniformly
bounded over all ω and x.
Finally, we now prove that σ is Lipschitz continuous in x with uniform Lipschitz constant.
This follows from a result of Montrucchio (1987, Theorem 3.1). In particular, their result
implies that for each i, each ω, and any pair x,x0,
||gi(ω,·,x) − gi(ω,·,x
0)||0 <γ ||x − x
0||0 (23)
where γ is the MSI bound in Assumption (A4). Using the diﬀerence map in (20) to deﬁne
the ﬁxed points, the Implicit Function Theorem again implies that (23) applies to the ﬁxed
point, ¯ σ, as well to the best response map g.
Proof of Lemma 2 By deﬁnition,




0| ω,¯ σ(ω,x)) dη
The smoothness therefore follows from the smooth of H in ω directly and from the smooth-
ness of ¯ σ(ω,x)i nω established in Lemma 1. The uniform boundedness of ﬁrst derivatives
in ω follows from the C∞-uniform boundedness of H and the uniform boundedness of ﬁrst
derivatives of ¯ σ established in Lemma 1.
Proof Lemma 3 Let {x`} be a sequence such that x` ∈Xfor all ` and x` → x ∈Xwith the
convergence uniform on each compact set Y ⊂ Ωa s` →∞ . By Lemma 2, we also know that
by Lipschitz continuity of ¯ σ in x, ||¯ σ(·,x `)−¯ σ(·,x)|| → 0 uniformly in ω. Consequently, by the
smoothness properties of ui for each i and of f we can ﬁx ￿>0 and let ¯ ` satisfy for all ` ≥ ¯ `, all




￿ω,¯ σ(ω,x`)) | <￿ .



















With these results we see that:
27||(Tx
`)i(·) − (Tx)i(·)||0
= ||Hi(·, ¯ σ(·,x
`),x
`) − Hi(·, ¯ σ(·,x),x)||0
≤ (1 − δ)||ui(·, ¯ σ(·,x



















< (1 − δ)￿ + δ￿ = ￿
Hence T is continuous.
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